In this paper we describe use of the Aquila active well neutron coincidence counter for nuclear material assays of 235
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we describe testing, efficiency calibration, and use of the Aquila 1 active well neutron coincidence counter (AWCC) for nuclear material assays and surveys. The instrument was brought to the Savannah River Site (SRS) in 1998 by a Brookhaven National Laboratory group for testing of neutron multiplicity algorithms. 2 A separate group of Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) researchers recognized the applicability of the instrument for assay of enriched U-Al fuel ingots at SRS K-Area nuclear material storage facility (KAMS). We set up the instrument using Los Alamos National Laboratory INCC software 3 to perform verification measurements of U-Al in the 1999 annual Department of Energy (DOE) inventory of reactor fuel ingots stored at SRS. Startup of the instrument using the INCC software, efficiency calibration, and the 1999 verification measurements are described thoroughly in reference 4. The instrument has been used subsequently for these annual DOE inventory verification measurements in 2000 -2006 and will continue to be used for the foreseeable future.
In addition to the KAMS U-Al verification measurements, the authors have discovered and devised multiple other applications for the active neutron coincidence counting technique. These involve uses in the active and passive acquisition modes and in the thermal and fast fission acquisition modes, uses as a portable neutron survey instrument, and utility for verification measurements of three distinct types of highly enrich uranium over three diverse dynamic ranges. Specifically we have performed experimental programs that include
• Verification measurements of U-Al fuel ingots in the fast fission neutron coincidence counting mode with a dynamic range of 100 -1300 g.
• Verification measurements of U metal at Argonne West National Laboratory in the fast fission neutron coincidence counting mode with a dynamic range of 100 -5000g.
• At-line verification measurements of U process waste in the HB-Line facility at SRS in the thermal fission neutron coincidence counting mode with a dynamic range of 5 -35 g.
• Evaluation of neutron background and personnel exposure concerns in the deactivated Californium Production facility at SRNL using the AWCC as a passive survey instrument.
• Evaluation of criticality concerns in the decommissioned Naval Fuels facility using an external activation source to adapt the instrument as an active survey instrument.
• Passive neutron multiplicity verification measurements of Pu and mixed U/Pu items.
We describe the experimental programs for each of these measurements in detail in the EXPERIMENTAL section of this paper. We further describe plans to use this instrument in DOE Office of Security development work for future non-proliferation programs in the DOE, International Atomic Energy (IAEA), and Department of Homeland Security. (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EXPERIMENTAL
The Aquila AWCC uses two Am-Li(α,n) neutron sources to activate thermal fission in the samples. The AWCC instrument is shown on its side in the photograph of Figure 1 . A photograph of the Am-Li activation sources and of one of the polyethylene moderators is shown in Figure 2 . The two sources have 241 Am α-activities of 4.4x10 10 dps and yield (α,n) neutron rates of approximately 50000 n/sec. With no sample in place, these sources yield an active background of approximately 6537 neutron singles events/sec (eps) in the fast fission mode and an active coincidence background of (< 0.1 eps). Thus the instrumental singles efficiency is approximately 7% for the activation sources, with a corrected random coincidence rate of <2x10 -5 . With the sources placed in the center of the sample cavity the detection efficiency was measured to be 25.3(3)% (11) . The latter efficiency of 25% is our best measure of sample neutron singles efficiency. We discuss the random coincidence correction, which is a very important part of neutron coincidence measurements, below.
Stability in the active background is a very important feature for successful operation of this instrument. In our initial set up back in 1999 we observed over a 112-day period a one sigma standard deviation of 35 cps in the active singles background, and a one sigma standard deviation of 0.8 eps in the active doubles background. These variances were obtained from five background counts taken fairly evenly spaced over the 112-day period. The passive neutron background (obtained with no Am-Li activation sources) was always < 1 cps. These background rates compare favorably with those taken by Cowgill and Lu. Active well coincidence neutron counting is a well known technique for assay of 235 U content in solid samples and has been described previously. 3, 12, 13 Details for this instrument are described in references 1 and 4. The instrument used in the work 01/08/07 described here is the extended cavity Aquila Technologies serial number KCC-51-DEV well counter. It contains an assembly of 42 3 He detector tubes mounted in two concentric circles in polyethylene moderator blocks. The neutron signals are summed using a PSR-B shift register coincidence counting circuit with the detector parameters shown in Table  1 . For all of the work described in this paper the instrument was operated with the Los Alamos National Laboratory INCC neutron coincidence software program. 3 This program is used for set up, operation, data acquisition, and data analysis to relate detected coincidence events to 235 U mass. The program also triggers printing of hardcopy output. Examples are included below. 
U-Al Fuel Ingot Verification Measurements at SRS
Our initial use of the Aquila instrument was for the annual DOE inventory of U-Al fuel elements that are stored at the SRS K-Area Material Storage facility (KAMS). These fuel elements were all manufactured at the SRS M-Area fuel fabrication facility. Though the existing fuel is far from virgin material, the M-Area specifications 14 required that it be very pure of fission product and plutonium components. Because the SRS fuel is pure of plutonium, it has a very low passive neutron emission rate and is very well suited for assay of the 235 U content by active well induced fission neutron counting. Even though the fission product β−γ activity is very low, assay of 235 U by γ-PHA is not suitable because the fuel elements are dense enough to approach infinite thickness for the low energy 186-keV γ-ray from 235 U.
We performed an initial set of measurements and activities in the Savannah River Site (SRS) K reactor assembly area. We conducted two separate calibrations of active doubles response versus known mass of 235 U using U-Al fuel ingots. The 235 U masses varied over the range 247 g to 1190 g. Background counts were taken with the AWCC cavity empty as opposed to using a blank ingot. The two response calibration curves were taken fifty-four days apart. We show data from both in this paper to provide an example of the instrument stability. The data we show below demonstrate excellent instrumental stability.
Data for the first calibration at SRS were taken using six 100-second counts for every standard. All of the doubles response versus known 235 U are shown in Table 2 . The data are plotted in Figure 3 . The solid curve is the best quadratic fit to the calibration symbols with the curve forced through the origin. The equation for the calibration curve is
where m is known mass in grams of 235 U. The calibration data of Table 2 include 235 U/ 236 U enrichment ratios, which vary over the range 1.39 to 3.95. These data demonstrate the independence of the method from this parameter. Table 2 that the uncertainty in the doubles rate for the 247 gram standard is almost 33% for this short 100-second counting time curve. For the second acquisition of calibration data we were interested in reducing that uncertainty as well as demonstrating the stability of the calibration curve after the instrument had been powered off for a long time period. To demonstrate both of these objectives we acquired a new calibration curve using five of the same calibration standards spanning the same range of mass. This time we acquired data on the 247-g and 1190-g standards for six 300-second counts, and we acquired the data for the other three standards for the six 100-second counts. These data were acquired 54 days after the calibration data of Figure 3 , where the instrument was powered off for the intervening duration.
Note in
The second set of calibration data are plotted in Figure 4 along with the best fit calibration curve. Note we obtain much better precision for the 247-g standard. The equation for the curve is
Equations (1) and (2) are very similar in shape and agree within experimental uncertainty over the entire calibration range. Equation (2) has a positive first derivative all the way out to masses greater than 4 kg. The excellent agreement between the two curves demonstrates the good stability of the instrument. We have used this instrument for the verification measurements required for the 1999 -2006 DOE inventory of U-Al fuel ingots stored in the K-reactor Assembly area at SRS. The instrument has been very stable over this period of six years. We were able to use the efficiency calibration curve of equation (2) Table 3 we show the measured active backgrounds and active doubles rates for the 1190-g and 247-g standards for the 1999, 2002, and 2004 calibrations. The shape of the calibration curves never changed significantly from those of equations (1) and (2). Grams Of U-235
Doubles Rate
The 1999 -2006 verification measurements are plotted in Figure 5 . The best linear fit of the data in Figure 5 has a slope of 1.0037, which demonstrates excellent correlation of measured doubles rate with U-235 mass. These data demonstrate very good analytical performance characteristics for the active well counter for use in assay of U-Al fuel ingots.
Figure 5.
Measured twenty-six point verification data acquired for instrument qualification.
We have already noted the independence of this measurement technique from the 235 U/ 236 U ratio. In our verification acquisitions of 1999 -2005 we have observed the declared enrichment for each of the items. The total uranium masses varied over almost a factor of 1.5. The ratio of declared 235 U mass to total mass varied over the range 0.082 to 0.14. The capability of the instrument to perform these U-Al verifications appears to be independent of 235 U enrichment.
Argonne West Metalic U Measurements
In May of 1999 we conducted an extensive set of data acquisitions at Argonne West National Laboratory in Idaho Falls. These experiments were conducted mainly to test a Brookhaven National Laboratory multiplicity algorithm, but were also very valuable to test the instrument's 235 U coincidence assay capabilities at higher masses and coincidence rates. In these experiments we conducted important acquisitions to test the passive coincidence rates contributed by samples up to 5 kg in 235 U mass and up to 35g in 236 U mass and 1460 g in 238 U mass. We also observed the effect of (α, n) reactions and neutron multiplication on the singles rate and coincidence rate. In the Argonne West experiments we used pure, metallic U samples with 78% enrichment. The acquisitions at Argonne West (ANL) were performed by starting with a sample that contained 5.098 kg of 235 U and then removing an aliquot of the sample as we progressed from one acquisition to the next. Therefore each sample counted represented identically a portion of the previous sample. This is opposed to the SRS measurements that were made on completely distinct samples each time. For each ANL acquisition we obtained multiple counts (generally ten) of duration varying from 60 seconds up to 3600 seconds. Data were acquired using the fast fission counting parameters of Table 1 .
The data acquired are summarized in Table 4 . The 235,236,238 U masses were determined gravimetrically and calculated from the known stoichiometry. The instrument singles, doubles, and triples responses are shown in the table, including two active background counts. In Table 5 we have listed the singles and doubles response for three passive acquisitions. The data of Table 5 were acquired with the Am-Li activation sources removed from the instrument. Note that the passive singles background is very nearly independent of sample mass and that the doubles and triples rates are only very slowly varying.
The doubles data of Table 4 are plotted in Figure 6 . The coincidence data are fit with the quadratic curve
The extremely good linearity of equation (3) demonstrates that the instrument response is a reliable measure of 235 U mass over the entire range 0 to 5 kg. That is, second order non-linear effects like detector deadtime, neutron absorption, passive neutron production by (α,n) or spontaneous fission, and neutron multiplication are not significant factors. We note that the best fit quadratic coefficient is positive in equation (3), which might indicate neutron multiplication begins to contribute at the high masses.
Neutron Multipication
Neutron multiplication can cause a significant contribution to neutron multiplicity assays of Pu metal items. We have observed that multiplication is a very important consideration for the assay of receipted metallic Pu items at the SRS KAMS facility. 15 Modeling multiplication correctly is very important for passive multiplicity assays of Pu and for active multiplicity assays of U 16, 17 , so we observed our data closely for indication of such effects in the high mass region of the metallic U active coincidence assays. We are almost without doubt observing limited multiplication at ANL with the triples to doubles ratios that we discuss below. However we believe that multiplication is not a significant contributor to the overall coincidence rates observed and that multiplication is clearly not a dominant factor in our acquisitions. Multiplication, like random coincidences, would tend to make the doubles rates bend upward from linearity. Contrary to the shape of the SRS coincidence curves of Figures 3 and 4 , the ANL coincidence data of Figure 6 bends very slightly upward, perhaps indicating minor contributions to multiplication at the high mass end of the curve. 
Ratio of Triples to Doubles
We finally investigate the ratio of triples events to doubles events in the SRS U-Al measurements and ARL metallic U measurements. That ratio is plotted in Figure 7 for the ANL and in Figure 8 for the SRS data. Note at SRS the ratio T(riples)/D(oubles) is nearly flat, equal to 0.11, and independent of sample mass. At ANL the data are clearly related to sample 235 U mass. The ratio T/D at 5098 grams is 0.38(1) and still rising. The ANL T/D data are in good agreement with data acquired by Ensslin at the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant. 
Grams of U-235 Triples to Doubles Ratio
Since the neutron multiplicity for 235 U fission is 2.41, neutron multiplication can cause the T/D ratio to climb with increasing fission (increasing mass). It is not surprising that this effect is observable at ANL for masses ranging up to 5 kg with 78% enrichment and not observable at SRS for mass of only 3kg with only 14% enrichment. The increasing T/D rate at ANL is undoubtedly affected by neutron multiplication, and it is slightly influencing measured doubles rates. However, over the mass range of samples we measured, neutron multiplication has only a very slight effect. Another factor is the simple multiplicity of 235 U fission. With increasing fission rate, the probability of detecting a true triple coincidence goes up. The measured T/D ratios clearly indicate to us that active multiplicity analysis becomes an important consideration for highly enriched U metal samples, and we are developing that technique of analysis at our facility.
Trace Uranium Verifications in Desicooler Material at the SRS HB-Line Facility
In September of 2003 we used the Aquila active well counter for verification measurements of enriched uranium in a concrete matrix at the SRS HB-Line Facility. These measurements and the sequence of events from which the requirements evolved are described in reference 19. In this set of at-line acquisitions we used the instrument in the thermal fission mode to perform verification measurements in a challenging concrete matrix that was in the early stages of drying. In these acquisitions the dynamic range of 235 U content was 8 -35 g, which is far below the range of the fast fission measurements described above. A further complication was the young age of the concrete matrix, which yielded variable moisture content and thus variable moderation.
The HB-Line facility was involved in a campaign to dispose of 4.3 kg of FB-Line Desicooler material (HEU oxides). Facility Operations planned to mix the material with Portland cement and de-ionized water to create a waste form that meets the Attractiveness Level E criterion for "SNM micro-encapsulated in refractory compounds or in solid-dilution". To meet these requirements the material was repackaged into 172 one-gallon paint cans. Each paint can would contain approximately 3 kg of cement waste and 8 -40 g of 235 U. The DOE-SR approval directed that the discard campaign use the FB-Line accountability shippers values and that HB-Line Facility and the Savannah River Material Protection and Accountability group provide verification measurements of the solid waste product. At the time of planning, the HB-Line facility was not able to provide the required verification measurements with any available assay equipment. The Analytical Development Section (ADS) of the SRNL recommended use of the ADS active well coincidence counter to provide the required measurements at-line on-going with the production campaign.
We transported the Aquila AWCC to the HB-Line facility and set up the counter inside the contamination area of the facility operations. The personal computer and INCC 5.02 acquisition and analysis software were set up remotely outside of the contamination area as shown in the photograph of Figure 9 . A photograph of the at-line use of the instrument is shown in Figure 10 . After each paint can preparation and a period of two hours for drying, the can was introduced directly into the AWCC cavity for a verification measurement of the reported FB-Line HEU content. A one gallon paint can fits almost exactly into the cavity of the active well. Using one of the activation sources centered in the instrument cavity as a sample we performed passive acquisitions in both the fast and thermal mode to observe the singles rates. We observed a singles efficiency of 27.8% in the thermal mode and 25.1% in the fast mode. The latter efficiency was in extremely good agreement with the measured fast mode efficiencies above. Since sensitivity of the method would be an important issue for the low mass range, we elected to use the thermal mode of operation with the identical acquisition detector parameters and timing characteristics of Table 1 .
The time demands of the project did not allow us an experimental program to re-evaluate the die-away times and deadtime correction parameters for the thermal mode of acquisition. We anticipated that the observed singles and doubles rates would be low enough that deadtime corrections would have little impact. It is likely that an experimental measure of the optimum die-away time of the detectors would be slightly longer than the fast fission value of 52.36 µsec. Optimizing the die-away time would influence the shape of our calibration curve, but we believe our calibration data below demonstrate a good instrumental response.
After selecting the thermal mode of acquisition, we fashioned a block of the cement matrix with a cavity so that we could use it to simulate the effect of the matrix. We placed one of the activation sources into the cavity of the cement block and then placed it inside the AWCC well. With that configuration we observed our singles efficiency of neutrons coming from the simulated sample matrix. Our measured efficiency was 23.1%.
HB-Line operators made three working standards of Desicooler material using the identical process to distribute the standard HEU material in actual cement matrices. These working standards had HEU contents of 8.57 g, 28.28 g, and 32.35 g. We calibrated the instrument using these three working standards using twenty 900-second acquisitions. The measured neutron rates are listed in Table 6 , and the doubles efficiency calibration curve is shown in Figure 11 . Over the next several weeks we performed verification measurements on 67 product samples as directed by the Department of Energy-Savannah River. A scatter plot of the verification measurements is shown in Figure 12 . Figure 12 excludes measurements on three items that had huge positive biases in the results. We were able to trace the bias on those items to contributions from spontaneous fission of Pu trace contamination in those items. We confirmed this by removing the activation sources from the AWCC and counted all three items in the passive acquisition mode. We observed up to 2900 cps of passive singles, up to 180 passive doubles/sec, and up to 19 passive triples/sec on these items. The DOE-SR customer accepted our evaluation of these items and waived the required verification measurements on them. Since these desicooler items came originally from FB-Line, it was not difficult to accept the likelihood of trace Pu contributions. 01/08/07 Figure 11 . Desicooler Calibration.
Figure 12. HB-Line Verifications
The verifications of Figure 12 and the calibrations of Figure 11 contain corrections to the observed singles and doubles rates that were derived by Cowgill in reference 2. This correction deals with leakage multiplication for the active well counter. The corrected doubles rate (D c ) is evaluated relative to the observed doubles rate (D o ) in equation (4).
where S is the total singles for the item assayed (including active background) and S 0 is the active singles background. For our assays the largest doubles correction was less than 
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5%, and the largest verification mass correction was 7 g of HEU. While none of these corrections improved the verification measurements significantly, they did significantly improve the linearity of the calibration curve of Figure 11 . Cowgill has evaluated our verification measurements obtained on metallic U at Argonne West National Laboratory above, and has demonstrated the very slight upbending of the curve of equation (3) is due to multiplication, as we suspected. 2 This very successful campaign proved to be an adequate basis for subsequent SRNL acquisitions to book unknown U values in receipted Desicooler samples from FB-Line. When ATS received Desicooler samples whose total U content were in the region of 100g, and whose apparent content was far less than that, they requested assay assistance from AD. We performed transmission corrected γ-PHA assays on these samples as well as neutron activation acquisitions with our portable active well counter. The results of these combined acquisitions allowed SRNL MC&A to book new and more credible, lower HEU values for eight receipted samples. 20 These book value acquisitions were performed in 2006, 29 months after the HB-Line Desicooler campaign. Before performing the thermal mode active well book value measurements, we used the active well in the passive neutron multiplicity mode to confirm there were no significant Pu contributions to the SNM contents of each sample. We discuss passive neutron multiplicity verification measurements with the active well counter in the last section of this paper.
We do not tabulate the active assays of these eight samples, but list results only. Each had measurable active doubles rates in the range -0.5 -0.4 events/sec, but each was below the sensitivity limit for the assay method. We were able to set limits of 4 g 235 U in each sample. This limit of detection is in excellent agreement with the content measured by γ-PHA of 0.03 -3.8 g HEU.
SRTC Passive Neutron Activites
In a fourth demonstration of the utility of the Aquila active well counter, we set it up as a portable neutron monitor for passive acquisitions in the Savannah River National Laboratory (Savannah River Technology Center) F-wing Californium Production Facility to evaluate the anomalous behavior of the observed neutron background of that facility. 21 Over the years of the 1990's the F-wing of SRNL was believed to have a neutron background that was due solely to the 252 Cf stored and held up in the facility. However by 1999 it was obvious that the neutron background was not decaying with the suitable 2.6-yr 252 Cf half-life. The authors were requested to investigate the issue.
Using the active well counter as a portable passive neutron detector we obtained passive singles and coincidence rates at multiple acquisition points on both the service floor and main floor of SRNL F-wing. The singles rate results are shown in Figures 13 and 14 .
Using this technique it was an easy process to identify the hot spots on both floors of the F-Wing facility. On the main floor the highest neutron rate was observed to be 10859 cps in room F-103, which is immediately above the service floor room F-003 where we observed a rate of 33155 cps. One hotter spot (45321 cps) and another high rate (22706 cps) were observed on the service floor. The latter two could be likely associated with the Californium Production Facility, while the former two could not. The observed passive doubles rates added very interesting data.
If the neutron background could be associated with 252 Cf from the Californium Production Facility as assumed, then there ought to be an observable doubles rate. That is, 252 Cf produces neutrons from spontaneous fission, and these neutrons can be expected to have a multiplicity of near three. We would expect the doubles rates to be strongly suppressed compared to the observed singles rates because the source was not inside our portable monitor. But we expect the doubles rates to be non-zero. Our hypothesis for the hot spot in F-003 was that the source was not 252 Cf but rather a PuBe or AmLi neutron activation source. Neither of these two would be expected to yield doubles events. Or experimental observations shown in Table 7 supported the hypotheses associated with the observed singles rates. Note the doubles rate associated with the singles rate of 45321 that we denote as CAM-39 is 137 events per second, and the doubles rate associated with the singles rate of 22706 that we denote as Glovebox 10 is 119 events per second. The doubles rate associated with the singles rate of 33155 that we measured outside of F-003 is (-4.6±8.6) events per second and the doubles rate associated with the singles rate of 10859 that we denote as filer 329 is only (18±12). The other two acquisitions in the area (Filter 326 and filter 327) have no measurable doubles rates.
Note also the SED facility, which is associated with Pu production, does not have a measurable doubles rate. We concluded that the singles rates near the CPF were predominantly from decay of 251, 252 Cf while the high rates near F-003 came from a PuBe neutron activation source. To further reinforce our conclusions, we obtained passive γ-PHA analyses of each neutron acquisition point using a portable high purity germanium (HpGe) detector. We do not show any of the γ-ray spectra we obtained. Each of the important ones are displayed in reference 21. The spectra from F-091 glovebox 10 and from a 252 Cf source displayed multiple transitions at 177-, 227-, 253-, 333-, and 388-keV that originate from the isotopes 249,251 Cf co-produced with 252 Cf. None of these were observed in the spectra from outside F-003 or from outside the SED facility. The SED facility spectrum contained a very strong signal from multiple γ-rays associated with 239 Pu decay, and the spectrum obtained from outside F-003 contained a transition at 153-keV from decay of 238 Pu.
We finally obtained neutron acquisitions from the Analytical Development Section 252 Cf neutron activation facility to confirm that we would observe passive measurable doubles rates from a 252 Cf source external to our well counter. Table 8 summarizes those acquisitions where with each successive acquisition we have brought the source closer to the portable active well instrument. Acquisition b003source1 was obtained from 9 feet, the next two from approximately five feet on successive days, B-003 Cf 4 was obtained from 3 feet, and B-003 Cf 5 was obtained with the source inside the chamber of the active well counter. It is clear that a 252 Cf source produces a doubles rate that rapidly drops off with distance. This decrease in doubles rate can be attributed to the simple geometric distance effect as well as to the increased scatter which eliminates the coincidence relationship between correlated neutrons. From the passive data acquired with the neutron well counter in SRNL F-Wing associated with the passive γ-PHA data and associated with the passive data acquired with the neutron well counter with a known 252 Cf source, we were able to determine conclusively that the SRNL F-Wing neutron background was not composed exclusively of 252 Cf activity. We were also able to identify the two main sources of non-252 Cf neutron activity. Upon our evaluation and recommendation, the PuBe source that we "discovered" in F-003 was removed. This substantially reduced the contemporary neutron background in F-Wing and transformed the existing background to one that is decaying as expected with the 2.6-year 252 Cf half-life. Module F-003 has been renovated into a productive actinide chemistry laboratory.
247-F Activation Analyses
The last use of the Aquila active well counter that we discuss is one in which we evaluated the HEU content of two incompletely labeled 55-gallon drums discovered in the deactivation and decommissioning of the 247-F Naval Fuels (NF) Facility at SRS. The two drums were discovered inside of a warehouse used by the NF facility. The drums were not adequately labeled but appeared to be spaced apart with fixed geometry to ensure criticality safety. The apparent fixed geometry raised criticality concerns with regard to movement of the two drums. Since the facility was constructed with the intention to manufacture nuclear propulsion fuel for the navy, a criticality concern was a credible event. [22] [23] [24] The Facilities Disposition Department (FDD) requested the authors to conduct a nondestructive assay to determine if these drums contained fissile materials and in what quantity.
Our initial evaluation of these two drums utilized segmented transmission corrected γ-PHA of each of the two drums. These acquisitions and the calculations are described in reference 25. A photograph of one of the acquisitions is shown in Figure 15 . For the transmission correction of each drum segment we measured the direct transmission of the 661.6-keV γ-ray using a 137 Cs transmission source. From each direct measurement of transmission of the 137 Cs we calculated an areal density for the segment and from there calculated the absorption of the 185.7-keV γ-ray from decay of 235 U. From the corrected detection rate we determined limits of content for each segment in both of the two drums. Our measured data established limits of 1 g and 0.4 g of 235 U in the two drums. 01/08/07 Figure 15 . Photograph of the Naval Fuels gamma PHA setup.
While these γ-ray measurements appeared to completely satisfy the criticality concerns of FDD, the calculated transmission corrections for the six segments of the two drums ranged from 1.07 to 12.91 and clearly demonstrated a non-uniform distribution of mass inside the drums. The correction factors of 9.6, 12.9, and 7.6 in one of the drums demonstrated a content of very highly absorbing items. We believed that a neutron measurement was required to confirm and reinforce our passive γ-ray measurements.
To obtain neutron measurements of the 235 U content of these two drums it was necessary to devise a method to activate any HEU that might be present in the drums and to count the fission neutrons generated. Since it was not possible to place the 55-gallon drums inside of our active well detector, it was necessary to activate and measure the drums externally. An external efficiency calibration was required. A slab detector would have been the ideal solution. SRNL now possesses just such a detector 26 , but we did not at the time.
The external activation efficiency calibration was performed on the loading dock of the M-Area Reactor Fuel Fabrication Facility using a 252 Cf source, scratch polyethylene moderation and reflection, and with fourteen HEU sources. The fourteen separate sources allowed us to perform the calibration with multiple combinations of HEU mass that ranged from less than one gram up to 400 grams. We obtained activation data for increments of approximately 50 g from 0 to 400. The 252 Cf source strength was approximately 10 5 neutrons/sec (reference 27). In each case the separate HEU sources were placed inside of an empty 55-gallon drum and the 252 Cf was rested on top of the drum as shown in Figure 16 . Polyethylene reflection and moderation were set up as shown in Figure 16 .
The measured singles and doubles rates are listed in Table 9 , where the active background rates of 252 Cf only have been subtracted from the measured data using the INCC software. While the activated doubles rates are not conclusive, it is clear that the measured singles rates correlate with 235 U mass in the range 150 g -300 g. Using this technique of neutron activation, we believe that our measurement system is sensitive to HEU masses down to 150 g 235 U. We performed neutron activation measurements on the two drums. The AWCC measurements allowed us to qualitatively search for chunks of material. The AWCC is designed to use observed neutron coincidence rates to measure HEU content of samples that are placed inside the well of the instrument. For those samples it has a sensitivity of approximately 50 g when used in the fast mode, as our U-Al and metal U results above demonstrate. In this adoption we have utilized the instrument to count neutrons from samples that have been activated external to the instrument. This greatly reduces our detection efficiency, so that measuring coincidence events was not practical. We have attempted to measure neutron singles rates to search for evidence of activated 235 U.
Our activation measurements of the two drums in the Naval Fuels warehouse facility yielded null results. Neither the measured singles nor doubles rates were above active background rates of 1190 singles/sec and 15 doubles/sec. While the AWCC results we obtained did not allow us to set limits of HEU chunks inside the drums, we were able to state that we had negative qualitative evidence of any such chunks being inside the drums.
Passive Neutron Multiplicity Measurements in SRNL
In August and December of 2005 the Actinide Technology Section of SRNL received separate items of special nuclear material that appeared to be mislabeled. On each occasion ADS was requested to perform a confirmatory measurement of the items to confirm content. For both receipts we performed a passive γ-PHA analysis to confirm HEU content in the August receipt and to confirm 238, 239 Pu content in the December receipt. In each case the γ-ray measurement was adequate for confirmatory identification of the nuclear material, but in neither case was the γ-ray measurement unambiguously acceptable for quantitative assay. The HEU measurements was made difficult be the strongly absorbing material, and the Pu-isotopics assay was made difficult by the very high rate coming from the 238 Pu component. We quickly recognized the advantage that a portable neutron multiplicity counter would have given us.
Subsequent to the 238,239
Pu γ-ray acquisitions we tested the Aquila instrument for its capabilities as a passive neutron multiplicity assay device for Pu content. Our nuclear material stored in the SRNL nuclear NDA laboratory was especially well suited for this test. We have two Pu sources of varying isotopics and multiple HEU sources that allow us to compile incremental sources of HEU of up to 400 grams in 235 The results of the passive neutron multiplicity analyses of these "three" samples are listed in Table 10 . Note we have two separate acquisitions of the first sample 500411 to demonstrate the difference obtained between comparatively short and comparatively long acquisition times. From the data of Table 10 we believe the active well counter has demonstrated excellent capabilities to perform passive neutron multiplicity analyses of Pu in the mass range 0.8 -10 g. We subsequently performed NMC verification measurements on receipted HEU samples from FB-Line and from the F-Area Material Storage facility so that we could treat them as HEU unknowns for our AWCC monitor. The measured values for these samples are shown in Table 11 Table 11 confirmed that the samples were eligible for active well analysis for HEU content. In Table 12 we show measurements of four samples of special nuclear material using passive neutron multiplicity counting to demonstrate the capabilities of the active well counter for Pu verification measurements. For none of these four samples did we have a certified Pu-240 isotopics content, so we used a constant value of 6.0% in each of the analyses. The multiplication and calculated alpha values for each are listed in Table 13 , which also contains the multiplication and alpha values for the very successful NMC verification acquisitions of Table 10 . Note in three of the four tests of Table 12 we were able to demonstrate very good agreement within the uncertainty of the unknown Pu-240 isotopics. For sample 50014671 the instrument calculated a large multiplication and a very large and negative alpha value with a very large uncertainty. (Note the huge singles rate of 52782 cps.) This assists an operator to note when multiplicity counting fails. However even in the event of failure, the analytical software projected very large uncertainties in the Pu-240 and total Pu verification masses. These uncertainties assure that the operator would not "believe" and accept the measured values. Pu, and for evaluation of 252 Cf and 238,239 Pu contributions to observed ambient neutron backgrounds. The neutron activation measurements of 235 U content utilized both the fast mode and the thermal mode of neutron measurement to demonstrate nondestructive assay in three distinct mass ranges and for three distinct chemical forms of HEU. Use of the active well counter as a portable passive neutron monitor allowed us to determine the composition of the SRNL F-wing neutron background to explain why the background was not decaying with the appropriate half-life of a pure 252 Cf composition. The observations yielded identification of a 238 Pu(Be) source that was removed. The module was subsequently renovated for use as a productive chemical laboratory. We have also demonstrated the use of the active well instrument with external activation analysis to evaluate criticality concerns of two 55-gallon drums stored in an apparently critically safe geometry in the SRS Naval Fuels facility. Finally we have demonstrated the use of the active well monitor in the passive neutron multiplicity mode for 240 Pu and total Pu assays.
The quantitative nondestructive assay measurements include determination U metal, UAl, and Desicooler uranium waste. Nondestructive assay of U metal in the mass range of 0 -5000 g were demonstrated using the fast mode of activation at the Argonne West National Laboratory. Nondestructive assay of U-Al in the mass range of 50 -1300 g were demonstrated using the fast mode of activation at the SRS K-Area Material Storage facility. These nondestructive assay measurements have been used for seven successive years of verification measurements in the DOE annual inventory of U-Al fuel ingots. Finally nondestructive assay of waste Desicooler U material using the thermal activation mode in the mass range of 5 -35 g were demonstrated at the SRS HB-Line facility. These measurements provided HB-Line the capability for waste processing verification measurements that satisfied DOE requirement for discard of 4.3 kg of HEU as Attractiveness Level E material.
The thermal and fast modes of neutron activation were applied for measurement of HEU in the regime of < 4 g to assist with book value measurements of 235 U in the Actinide Technology Section of SRNL. To confirm each of the four samples assayed by activation were pure of Pu contributions, we performed a neutron multiplicity analysis on each of them. Null results were obtained, thus clearing the samples for activation analysis of HEU. For six of seven other SNM samples and composite SNM samples we have demonstrated accurate verification measurement capabilities using the passive neutron multiplicity measurement mode. These samples had Pu contents in the range 0.8 g -100 g with interfering HEU contents of up to 200 g.
